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The Meaning of Privatization
Paul Starr*
Privatization is a fuzzy concept that evokes sharp political reac-
tions. It covers a great range of ideas and policies, varying from the
eminently reasonable to the wildly impractical. Yet however varied
and at times unclear in its meaning, privatization has unambiguous
political origins and objectives. It emerges from the countermove-
ment against the growth of government in the West and represents
the most serious conservative effort of our time to formulate a posi-
tive alternative. Privatization proposals do not aim merely to return
services to their original location in the private sphere. Some pro-
posals seek to create new kinds of market relations and promise re-
sults comparable or superior to conventional public programs.
Hence it is a mistake to define and dismiss the movement as simply a
replay of traditional opposition to state intervention and expendi-
ture. The current wave of privatization initiatives opens a new chap-
ter in the conflict over the public-private balance.
This Article attempts to clarify the meaning of privatization as an
idea, as theory and rhetoric, and as a political practice. In the pro-
cess I hope to explain why I generally oppose privatization, even
though I favor some specific proposals that privatization covers.
But apart from this political judgment, I take privatization seriously
as a policy movement and as a process that show every sign of
reconstituting major institutional domains of contemporary society.
L Privatization as an Idea
In the ideological world we inhabit, contesting interests and par-
ties use "public" and "private" not only to describe but also to cele-
brate and condemn. Any serious inquiry into the meaning of
privatization must begin, therefore, by unloading the complex
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freight that the public-private distinction carries. In this section I
analyze, first, the general uses of the public-private distinction and.
second, the recent political application of the concept of
privatization.
A. The Public-Private Distinction and the Concept of Privatization
The terms public and private are fundamental to the language of
our law, politics, and social life, but they are the source of continual
frustration. Many things seem to be public and private at the same
time in varying degrees or in different ways. As a result, we quarrel
endlessly about whether some act or institution is really one or the
other. We qualify the categories: This group is quasi-public, that
one is semi-private. In desperation some theorists announce that
the distinction is outdated or so ideologically loaded that it ought to
be discarded, or that it is a distinction without a difference.' Yet the
terms can hardly be banished nor ought they.2 To speak intelli-
gently about modern societies and politics without using the words
public and private would be as great an achievement as writing a
novel with the word "the." However, neither is necessarily the sort
of achievement that other theorists or novelists would care to
imitate.
The frustration with these ubiquitous categories partly arises be-
cause public and private are paired to describe a number of related
oppositions in our thought. At the core of many uses are the two
ideas that public is to private as open is to closed, and that public is to
private as the whole is to the part. In the first sense, we speak of a
public place, a public conference, public behavior, making some-
thing public, or publishing an article. The private counterparts,
from homes to diaries, are private in that access is restricted and
visibility reduced. The concepts of publicity and privacy stand in
opposition to each other along this dimension of accessibility. Pub-
lic is to private as the transparent is to the opaque, as the announced
is to the concealed. Similarly, a person's public life is to his or her
private life as the outer is to the inner realm.
On the other hand, when we speak of public opinion, public
health, or the public interest, we mean the opinion, health, or inter-
1. See, e.g., Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. Pa. .. Rev.
1358 (1982); Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982); Freeman & Mensch, The Public/Private Distinction in Amer-
ican Law and Life, 3 Tikkun 24-30 (Mar./Apr. 1988).
2. Starr, A Response to Mensch and Freeman, 3 Tikkun 31 (Mar./Apr. 1988).
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est of the whole of the people as opposed to that of a part, whether a
class or an individual. Public in this sense often means "common,"
not necessarily governmental. The public-spirited or public-minded
citizen is one concerned about the community as a whole. But in the
modern world the concepts of governmental and public have be-
come so closely linked that in some contexts they are interchangea-
ble. The state acts for the whole of a society in international
relations and makes rules binding on the whole internally. Public
thus often means official. In this sense a "public act" is one that
carries official status, even if it is secret and therefore not public in
the sense of being openly visible. Indeed, according to the Oxford
English Dictionary, private originally signified "not holding public
office or official position." As Albert Hirschman points out, this is a
meaning that survives in the army "private," that is, the "ordinary
soldier without any rank or position." 3 Now, of course, private is
contrasted with public to characterize that which lies beyond the
state's boundaries, such as the market or the family.
These different contrasts between public and private lead to some
apparent conflicts in defining what lies on each side of the bound-
ary. One such conflict concerns the location of the market. To an
economist, the marketplace is quintessentially private. But to a soci-
ologist or anthropologist concerned with culture, the marketplace is
quintessentially public-a sphere open to utter strangers who none-
theless are able to understand the same rules and gestures in what
may be a highly ritualized process of exchange. While economists
use the public-private distinction to signify the contrast between
state and market, analysts of culture-particularly those concerned
with the roles and relations of men and women-take the public
sphere to include the market as well as politics and contrast them
both with the private domain of the family. In this sense, the public-
private distinction is sometimes taken to mark out the contested
boundaries of the male and female worlds-a usage that takes us
back to the notion of the private as being more closed, more
shielded from contact and view, than the open encounters of public
life.4
3. A. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action 121-22
(1982).
4. See, e.g., J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (1981); Rosaldo, Woman, Culture
and Society: A Theoretical Overview, in Woman, Culture and Society 17-42 (M. Rosaldo
& L. Lamphere eds. 1974); L. Imray & A. Middleton. Public & Private: Marking the
Boundaries, in The Public and the Private 12-16 (E. Gamarnikow, et al. eds. 1983).
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From these varying uses of the categories come several contrast-
ing conceptions of the public sphere. The public sphere may be
conceived of as the open and visible-the sphere of public life, pub-
lic theater, the public marketplace, public sociability. The public
sphere also may be conceived of as that which applies to the whole
people or, as we say, the general public or the public at large, in
which case the public may consist of an aggregate or a mass who
have no direct contact or social relation-the very opposite of a
sphere of sociability. Or the public sphere may be conceived specifi-
cally as the domain circumscribed by the state, although exactly
where to draw the state's boundaries may be difficult indeed.
The general meanings of privatization, then, correspond to with-
drawals from any of these variously conceived public spheres. His-
torians and sociologists write about the withdrawal of affective
interest and involvement from the sphere of public sociability. For
example, in their work on the development of the modern family,
Peter Willmott and Michael Young argue that as the modern house-
hold became equipped with larger homes, private cars, televisions,
and other resources, more time and capital came to be invested in
the private interior of the family and less in public taverns, squares,
and streets. 5 Similarly, Richard Sennett suggests that since the
eighteenth century modern society has seen a decline of public cul-
ture and sociability, a deadening of public life and public space, a
privatization of emotion. 6 Such arguments shade into a second
meaning of privatization: a shift of individual involvements from
the whole to the part-that is, from public action to private con-
cerns-the kind of privatization that Hirschman describes as one
swing in a public-private cycle of individual action.7 In this sort of
public-to-private transition, the swing is not from sociability to inti-
macy but from civic concern to the pursuit of self-interest.
Privatization can also signify another kind of withdrawal from the
whole to the part: an appropriation by an individual or a particular
group of some good formerly available to the entire public or com-
munity. Like the withdrawal of involvement, privatization in the
sense of private appropriation has obvious implications for the dis-
tribution of welfare.
From these meanings it is but a short step to the sense of priva-
tization as a withdrawal from the state, not of individual involve-
5. See M. Young & P. Willmott, The Symmetrical Family (1973).
6. See R. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man 16-24 (1977).
7. See Hirschman, supra note 3, at 121-30.
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ments, but of assets, functions, indeed entire institutions. Public
policy is concerned with privatization at this level. But the two
forms, the privatization of individual involvements and the privatiza-
tion of social functions and assets, are certainly related, at least by
ideological kinship. A confidence that pursuit of private gain serves
the larger social order leads to approval for both self-interested be-
havior and private enterprise.
Thus far I have been talking about privatization as if both spheres,
public and private, were already constituted. But in a longer per-
spective, their constitution and separation represent complementary
processes. Much historical experience corresponds to Simmel's par-
adoxical dictum that "what is public becomes ever more public, and
what is private becomes ever more private." 8 This is true specifi-
cally of the histories of the state and the family. The difference be-
tween patrimonial domination and modern bureaucracies, as Weber
describes the two, is precisely that in the patrimonial state public
and private roles were mixed and in the modern state these roles are
more clearly distinguished." The modern state distinguishes offices
and persons. The office is public, and its files, rules, and finances
are distinct from the personal possessions and character of individu-
als. As public administration and finance were separated from the
household and personal wealth of the ruler, the modern state be-
came, in effect more public; the person and family of the ruler, more
private.' 0 That the domestic sphere has generally become more pri-
vate is one of the classic themes of modern sociology and the history
of the family.I
The rise of the liberal state specifically entailed a sharpening of
the public-private distinction: on the one hand, the privatizing of
religious and moral belief and practice and of economic activity for-
merly regulated by the state; on the other, a commitment to public
law and public political discussion. Classical liberalism is often rep-
resented as a purely privatizing ideology, but liberals were commit-
ted to suppressing markets in votes, offices, and tax collection, not
to mention human beings. Strengthening the public character of
8. See G. Simmel, The Secret and the Secret Society, in The Sociology of Georg
Simmel 337 (K. Wolff ed. 1950). See also Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423 (1982).
9. M. Weber, 3 Economy & Society 1028-31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
10. See, e.g., R. Braun, Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great
Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia, in The Formation of National States in Western Eu-
rope 243-46 (C. Tilly ed. 1975); C. Webber & A. Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and
Expenditure in the Western World 148-51 (1986).
11. See P. Aries, Centuries of Childhood 411-15 (1962).
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the state is a continuity in liberal thought from its classical to con-
temporary phases. Moreover, as Stephen Holmes argues, the liberal
effort to privatize otherwise rancorous religious differences pro-
moted a civilized public order.' 2 Some kinds of privatization are not
the enemy of the public realm but its necessary support.
In liberal democratic thought, public and private are central terms
in the language of claims-making. In particular, they provide a
deeply resonant vocabulary for making claims against the state.
These are of two kinds. First, the concept of a public governmentimplies an elaborate structure of rules limiting the exercise of state
power. Those who wield power are to be held publicly accounta-
;ble-that is, answerable to the citizens-for their performance.
,Government decisions and deliberations must be publicly reported
and open to general participation. In short, the citizens of a liberal
state are understood to have a right to expect their government to
be public not only in its ends but also in its processes. Second,
when the members of a liberal society think of their homes, busi-
nesses, churches, and myriad other forms of association as lying in a
private sphere, they are claiming limits to the power of that demo-
cratic state. The limits are not absolute-private property rights, for
example, are not an insuperable barrier to public control or regula-
tion-but when crossing from public to private the presumptions
shift away from the state and any state intervention must meet more
stringent tests of the public interest.
Public and private in liberal thought have become pervasive duali-
ties-or, perhaps better said, polarities-associated with the state in
one direction, the individual in the other. Intermediate entities,
such as corporations typically have been divided between the two
categories. Until the nineteenth century in the United States, there
was no clear legal distinction between public and private corpora-
tions. Initially, cities were not sharply distinguished in the law from
business enterprise; but in the mid-1800s cities became classified as
agencies of the state, while business corporations came to be treated
as individuals. As public agencies, cities were allowed only such
powers as states delegated to them; as fictive individuals, private
corporations came to enjoy rights protected by the Constitution. "
This bifurcation between powers and rights lies at the foundation of
12. S. Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern liberalism 241-52
(1984).
13. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1980).
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the contemporary legal distinction between the public and private
sectors.
Behind the legal categories, of course, the boundaries are
blurred. On the one hand, private interests reach into the conduct
of the state and its agencies; on the other, the state reaches across
the public-private boundary to regulate private contracts and the
conduct of private corporations and other associations. Through
tax preferences and credit guarantees, the state shapes private eco-
nomic choices and relations. The state is immanent in the economy
and society, but the degree of penetration varies, and the public-
private system of classification is used to express these variations.
So, for example, among private corporations, we distinguish those
that are privately held from those that are publicly traded and sub-
ject to the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The latter are often called public corporations, by which we actually
mean public private corporations. Among those public private corpo-
rations are some subject to more extensive regulation, such as the
utilities, which are especially public, public private corporations. And
since the utilities, in turn, have some lines of business defined as
public and others as private, the public-private boundary runs
within them as well as around them.
It is as if, on finding two boxes labeled public and private, we were
to open the private box and find two more boxes labeled public and
private, which we would do again-and again-opening ever smaller
boxes until we reached the individuals far inside, whom we could
then split into respective offices and persons.' 4 Moreover, if the
boxes have been assembled by reasonably competent lawyers, they
may be extremely intricate and some will have misleading labels.
But this complexity and the legal manipulation of the categories do
not invalidate their usefulness or underlying meaning. To speak of
a public corporation in the private sector ought really to be no more
confusing than saying that North Carolina is in the South. Public
and private give us relative locations.
A further source of frustration with the public-private distinction
is that the terms do not have consistent meanings from one institu-
tional sphere to another. In the United States, the difference be-
tween public and private schools is not the same as the difference
between public and private television broadcasting. An American
public school is public, not only in that it is state owned and fi-
14. I am grateful to Gerald E. Frug for this analogy.
Vol. 6:6, 1988
The Meaning of Privatization
nanced, but also because it is open to all children of eligible age in
its area. Private schools can reject applicants, but public school sys-
tems are denied that option. Public is to private, not only as state is
to nonstate, but as open is to closed. However, in television broad-
casting, the viewing public has open access to commercial as well as
.public channels. The difference lies in financing and programming.
The public channels receive government support and do not choose
programming to maximize audience ratings, though in fact even
public broadcasting now competes for private corporate sponsor-
ship, and some public stations are legally organized as private non-
profit corporations.' 5 To make matters still more complicated, the
differences between public and private institutions do not follow
parallel lines in other countries. To take broadcasting again, public
television or radio in the United States is more dependent on pri-
vate financing, less subject to control by political authorities, and
less the symbolic voice of the state than the state-owned networks of
other Western nations, not to mention the Soviet bloc and Third
World.
To say public or private, therefore, is not sufficient to specify a
form of organization or even its relation to the state. Consequently,
it is extremely risky to generalize about public versus private organi-
zations-and, therefore, about the merits of privatization as public
policy-beyond a particular institutional or national context. No
general theory about the performance of public versus private orga-
nizations is likely to succeed if it fails to distinguish among political
systems.and the structural variety of public and private institutions.
Privatization describes a direction of change, but it does not denote
a specific origin or destination. Its meaning depends on the point of
departure-the public-private balance previously struck in a particu-
lar domain. And it is a critical question whether moving from public
to private in the sense of state to non-state entails a movement in
the other senses: from open to closed (in access to information) or
from the whole to the part (particularly in the distribution of
benefits).
B. The Political Meaning of Privatization
The term privatization did not gain wide circulation in politics un-
til the late 1970s and early 1980s. With the rise of conservative gov-
15. Powell & Friedkin, Politics and Programs: Organizational Factors in Public Tele-
vision Decision Making, in Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts 245-69 (P. Dimaggio ed.
1986).
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ernments in Great Britain, the United States, and France,
privatization has come primarily to mean two things: (1) any shift of
activities or functions from the state to the private sector; and, more
specifically, (2) any shift of the production of goods and services from
public to private.i Besides directly producing services, govern-
ments establish the legal framework of societies and regulate social
and economic life, and they finance services that are privately pro-
duced and consumed. The first, broader definition of privatization
includes all reductions in the regulatory and spending activity of the
state. The second, more specific definition of privatization excludes
deregulation and spending cuts except when they result in a shift
from public to private in the production of goods and services. This
more focused definition is the one that I shall use here. It leaves
open the possibility that privatization may not actually result in less
government spending and regulation-indeed, may even unexpect-
edly increase them.
Several further points about my definition need clarification.
First, the public sector here includes agencies administered as part
of the state and organizations owned by it, such as state enterprises
and independent public authorities like the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) or the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey. In the private sector I include not only commercial firms but
also informal and domestic activities, voluntary associations, coop-
eratives, and private nonprofit corporations.' 7
Second, in the definition I am using, privatization refers to shifts
from the public to the private sector, not shifts within sectors. Thus
the conversion of a state agency into an autonomous public author-
ity or state-owned enterprise is not privatization, though it may well
put the enterprise on a commercial footing.' This was the objec-
16. E.S. Savas defines privatization as "the act of reducing the role of government,
or increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets."
E. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government 3 (1987). 1 see nothing wrong
with this broad definition, so long as one realizes that some actions may reduce one role
of government while increasing another. For example, selling government-owned utili-
ties may result in establishing a new system of public regulation. Setting up a voucher
plan for education and housing may produce more public regulation of private schools.
In other words, policies conceived as privatization may have unintended consequences
for other dimensions of state intervention.
17. On the ambiguities of such classification, see generally Musolf & Seidman, The
Blurred Boundaries of Public Administration, 40 Pub. Admin. Rev. 124 (1980); A.
Walsh, The Public's Business (1980).
18. Glade uses the term "simulated privatization" to refer to the effort to put a pub-
lic enterprise on a commercial footing. Glade, Sources and Forms of Privatization, in
State Shrinking: A Comparative Inquiry into Privatization 2, 12-13 (W. Glade ed. 1987).
S. Henrique Abranches refers to the same process as "privatization of the logic of opera-
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tive, for example, of the conversion of the United States Post Office
into a public corporation, the United States Postal Service, in
1971. ' Similarly, the conversion of a private nonprofit organization
into a profit-making firm also is not privatization, though it, too,
may orient the firm toward the market. Both of these intrasectoral
changes might be described as commercialization; in the case of
public agencies, commercialization is sometimes a preliminary stage
to privatization.
Third, shifts from publicly to privately produced services may re-
sult not only from a deliberate government action, such as a sale of
assets, but also from the choices of individuals or firms that a gov-
ernment is unwilling or unable to satisfy or control. In many coun-
tries, private demand for education, health care, or retirement
income has outstripped public provision. As a result, private
schooling, medical care, and pensions have grown to relatively
larger proportions. This is demand-driven privatization. When priva-
tization is a demand-driven process, it does not require an absolute
reduction in publicly produced services. Stagnation or slow growth
in the public sector may be the cause. In some socialist societies the
growth of an "underground" economy represents a form of priva-
tization that is not a planned development (though it may well result
from development planning). In other words, as a process, priva-
tization encompasses more institutional changes than those
brought about by self-conscious privatization policies. It seems use-
ful, then, to distinguish instances of privatization according to
whether they are predominantly policy- or demand-driven.
Fourth, if one shifts attention from the sphere of production to
the sphere of consumption, one may alternatively define privatiza-
tion as the substitution of private goods for public goods. A public
good, in the economist's sense, has two distinguishing properties:
One person's consumption does not preclude another's; and ex-
cluding anyone from consumption is costly, if not impossible. The
prototypical example is fresh air. A public good need not be pro-
duced by government. A broadcast television program is a public
good even if it is provided by a commercially owned station; but
videotape is not, nor is programming on subscription cable services.
Any shift toward these forms of nonbroadcast television represents
tion'" of state enterprises. Abranches, State Enterprise and Modes of Privatization: A
Critical View Based on Brazilian Examples. in State Shrinking, supra, at 75, 79.
19. Willey, Taking the Post Office Out of Politics, Pub. Interest, Spring 1969. at 57-
71.
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a privatization of consumption, even if the local cable service is mu-
nicipally owned. -'
Depending on whether one is talking about the locus of produc-
tion or the forms of consumption, privatization can mean rather dif-
ferent things. In regard to production, "privatization of health
care" might mean a transfer of medical facilities from public to pri-
vate ownership; regarding consumption, it might refer to a shift in
expenditures from public health (environmental protection, vac-
cinations, etc.) to individual medical care. Similarly, "privatization
of transportation" might refer to the conversion of an urban bus
system from public to commercial ownership; or it might mean a
shift in ridership from buses to private automobiles, regardless of
whether the bus company is municipal or commercial. Strictly
speaking, public transportation is not a public good, since exclusion
is possible and only one person at a time can sit in a seat; however,
because buses and trains are open to the public at large, common
carriers are a distinctively public form of consumption compared to
private cars. More generally, the historical process described by
Willmott and Young-the concentration of consumption activities
in the home-represented a shift toward more privatized forms of
consumption. This shift has been the source of much criticism of
contemporary society, as in John Kenneth Galbraith's famous con-
trast of private opulence and public squalor in The Affluent Society. 2'
In this discussion, whenever referring specifically to a shift from
public goods to private goods, or from common carriers to private
carriers, I use the phrase "privatization of consumption." Other-
wise, I take privatization to mean a shift in the locus of the produc-
tion of services from public to private.
Four types of government policies can bring about such a shift.
First, the cessation of public programs and disengagement of gov-
ernment from specific kinds of responsibilities represent an implicit
form of privatization. At a less drastic level, the restriction of pub-
licly produced services in volume, availability, or quality may lead to
a shift by consumers toward privately produced and purchased sub-
stitutes (called "privatization by attrition" when a government lets
public services run down). Second, privatization may take the explicit
form of transfers of public assets to private ownership, through sale
or lease of public land, infrastructure, and enterprises. Third, in-
20. Starr, Television and the Public Household, in Television in America's Future-
A Search for the Right Public Policy (M. Rice ed.) (forthcoming).
21. SeeJ. Galbraith, The Affluent Society 195 (3rd ed. 1976).
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stead of directly producing some service, the government may fi-
nance private services, for example, through contracting-out or
vouchers. Finally, privatization may result from the deregulation of
entry into activities previously treated as public monopolies.
These forms of privatization vary in the extent to which they move
ownership, finance, and accountability out of the public sector. The
spectrum of alternatives runs from total privatization (as in govern-
ment disengagement from some policy domain) to partial privatiza-
tion (as in contracting-out or vouchers). As I define the term,
privatization may include policies anywhere along this spectrum;
however, the implications of privatization vary with its degree. In
cases of partial privatization, the government may continue to fi-
nance but not to operate services, or it may continue to own but not
to manage assets. Privatization may, therefore, dilute government
control and accountability without eliminating them. Where gov-
ernments pay for privately produced services, they must continue to
collect taxes. Privatization in this sense diminishes the operational
but not the fiscal or functional sphere of government action. By
putting the delivery of services into the hands of a third party, gov-
ernments may divert claims and complaints to private organizations,
but they also risk seeing those third parties become powerful claim-
ants themselves. Whether this sort of partial privatization achieves
any reduction in government spending or deficits must necessarily
be a practical, empirical question.
Even asset sales sometimes involve only the transfer of a partial
interest. Often governments sell some voting stock in an enterprise
but refuse to surrender control. In these instances, privatization
may amount to little more than a revenue-raising measure, as there
may be no change in management, management behavior, or the
enterprise's relation to state authorities. Although it may seem odd,
the product of privatization is not always a private firm: Privatiza-
tion also yields hybrid enterprises with varying balances of
influence.
The different techniques used to privatize assets affect what
emerges from privatization. Among the methods used are sales to
private bidders, sales by public stock offering, conversion to em-
ployee ownership, and transfer of title to the firm's current manag-
ers. In the case of unprofitable businesses, far from charging a
price, governments sometimes guarantee the new owners future
public contracts, tax benefits, or the monopoly on a franchise.
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These variations in privatization policy complicate simple-minded
predictions of the effects of privatization on economic efficiency.
Just as there are various methods for the divestiture of assets, so
too, various methods are available for shifting from publicly pro-
duced services to publicly financed private provision. Governments
face a basic choice as to whether state agencies or private parties will
do the purchasing. If the state purchases the service, it may enter
into contracts or grants. If, on the other hand, the government al-
lows private parties to purchase services, it may distribute vouchers,
offer tax credits or other tax preferences, indemnify beneficiaries di-
rectly for some proportion of their costs, or pay providers chosen by
beneficiaries. (The latter shades into contracting-out if the transac-
tions become routine.) To introduce yet a further complication, the
private parties whose costs the government defrays in whole or part
may be individuals (the consumers of services) or employers. Priva-
tization policy might, for example, call for the use of tax preferences
to induce a shift from publicly provided retirement benefits to bene-
fits provided by employers or to benefits provided through individ-
ual retirement accounts.22 When governments give up producing
services, they can "empower" many different parties.
Privatization should not automatically be equated with increased
competition. Two related processes, privatization and liberaliza-
tion, need to be carefully distinguished. By liberalization one gen-
erally means a reduction of government control; in this context, it
refers to the opening up of an industry to competitive pressures.
Entry deregulation of public monopolies is a form of privatization
that is also liberalizing. However, it is entirely possible to privatize
without liberalizing. When the Thatcher government sold shares of
British Telecom and British Gas, it substituted private monopolies
for public ones and introduced new regulatory agencies to perform
some of the functions previously undertaken through public owner-
ship. The option of putting liberalization first-that is, encouraging
greater competition-was expressly rejected, perhaps for fear that it
22. See, e.g., Ferrara, Social Security and the Super IRA: A Populist Proposal, in So-
cial Security: Prospects for Real Reform 193 (P. Ferrara ed. 1985): Goodman, Private
Alternatives to Social Security: The Experience of Other Countries, in Social Security,
at 103: O'Higgins, Public-Private Interaction and Pensions Provision, in Public-Private
Interplay in Social Protection (M. Rein & L. Rainwater eds. 1986); Starr, Social Security
and the American Public Household, in Social Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis
(I. Nashaw & T. Marmor eds.) (forthcoming).
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would reduce the share price of the companies. 23 Conversely, it is
also possible to liberalize without privatizing-that is, to introduce
competition into the public sector without transferring ownership.
For example, governments may allocate funds to schools according
to student enrollments where families are free to choose among
competing public schools; or they may require public enterprises or
operating agencies to compete for capital or contracts from higher-
level authorities. Indeed, it is even possible to nationalize and liber-
alize at the same time, as the French socialists demonstrated in the
early 1980s when they first nationalized banks and later liberalized
financial markets. 24
Finally, just as there are different routes out of the public sector,
so there are numerous destinations in the private sector to which
privatization may lead. The alternative possibilities may be classi-
fied according to organizational complexity and proprietary status:
first, the personal, domestic, or informal sector, thought to exem-
plify the virtues of self-reliance, mutual aid, and sensitivity to indi-
vidual preferences; second, the voluntary nonprofit, or "inde-
pendent," sector, consisting of formal, complex organizations,
thought to display the same virtues as the informal sector, plus the
advantages of professional leadership and management; third, the
small-business sector, acclaimed for entrepreneurship and revered
as a fountain of new jobs; and fourth, the large-scale corporate sec-
tor, where hopes for improved performance rest not only on the
profit motive but also on professional management and economies
of scale. The first two of these destinations, the informal and non-
profit sectors, remind us that privatization does not necessarily
mean a reliance on commercial markets. Indeed, instead of one des-
tination and one map, the advocates of privatization have several,
distinctly different conceptions of where they are going. I turn now
to the theories that provide the movement with its logic, intellectual
coherence, and rhetoric.
II. Privatization as Theory and Rhetoric
The normative theories justifying privatization as a direction for
public policy draw their inspiration from several different visions of
23. See, e.g., Privatization and Regulation: The U.K. Experience U. Kay & D. Thomp-
son eds. 1987); Brittan, The Politics and Economics of Privatisation, 55 Political Q 109,
116-21 (1984).
24. Francis, French Financiers Marvel at "Capitalists in Socialists' Clothing," Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, June 20, 1985, at 21.
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a good society. By far the most influential is the vision grounded in
laissez-faire individualism and free-market economics that promises
greater efficiency, a smaller government, and more individual choice
if only we expand the domain of property rights and market forces.
A second vision, rooted in a more socially minded conservative tra-
dition, promises a return of power to communities through a
greater reliance in social provision on families, churches, and other
largely nonprofit institutions. Privatization, in this view, means a
devolution of power from the state to ostensibly nonpolitical and
noncommercial forms of human association. Yet a third perspective
sees privatization as a political strategy for diverting demands away
from the state and thereby reducing government "overload." This
last view, identified particularly with recent neoconservative
thought, does not necessarily conflict with the other two-indeed,
some advocates of privatization draw on all three-but each vision
suggests a different framework for analysis and policy.
A. The Economic Theory of Privatization
Even within the economic theory of privatization, there are some
subtle but important differences between two approaches: the radi-
cal view of privatization as a reassignment of property rights and the
more moderate, conventional view of privatization as an instrument
for fine-tuning a three-sector economy.
1. Economic Model 1: Privatization as a Reassignment of Property
Rights. Private ownership and competitive markets are normally
thought to go hand in hand, but the two issues of ownership and
market structure are often separate. For the economist devoted to
both, the question then arises as to which object of affection is more
beloved: private ownership or competition. Here a difference of
opinion appears among economists that corresponds to a prefer-
ence for either privatization or liberalization. Those who believe
that efficient performance depends on private ownership per se
favor privatization, even in cases generally regarded as natural mo-
nopolies. Conversely, those who see competition as the critical spur
to efficiency are more skeptical about the benefits of privatizing mo-
nopolies and often put more emphasis on other policies, such as
deregulation. In the case of a government telecommunications mo-
nopoly, for example, those who stress ownership may be willing to
privatize the monopoly intact, whereas those who stress competition
may prefer to break it up before sale or even to keep it in public
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ownership while allowing private firms to compete with it on equal
terms.
Thus the perspective that unequivocally points to privatization as
desirable policy holds that property ownership is the fulcrum of
political economy. Curiously, the two unlikely bedfellows sharing
this appreciation of ownership are marxism and Chicago economics,
which draw from it opposite but equally strong conclusions about
the overriding importance of getting ownership into the right sec-
tor. From the Chicago tradition come two closely related clusters of
work: the theory of property rights and the theory of public choice.
Both attempt to enlarge the conventional economic paradigm by
treating the classical firm and modern package of property rights as
only one of various possible institutional forms. In this enlarged
model, public institutions merely represent an alternative property
rights configuration, which, on theoretical grounds, the Chicago
School predicts regularly will perform less efficiently than private
enterprise.
As developed by economists such as Armen Alchian, Ronald
Coase, and Harold Demsetz, the theory of property rights explains
differences in organizational behavior solely on the basis of the indi-
vidual incentives created by the structure of property rights. -5 In
this view, property rights specify the social and economic relations
that people must observe with each other in their use of scarce re-
sources, including not only the benefits that owners are allowed to
enjoy but also the harms to others that they are allowed to cause. A
right of ownership actually comprises several rights, chiefly the
rights to use an asset, to change it in form, substance, or location,
and to transfer all or some of these rights. Insofar as the state re-
stricts these rights, they become "attenuated." Thus the key issues
for the theory are, first, to whom are property rights assigned? and
second, how, if at all, are they attenuated?
Like other branches of microeconomics, the property rights
school conceives of human action as purely individualistic. The
more individuals stand to gain from tending to their property, the
better will it be tended. Conversely, the more attenuated and di-
luted their property rights, the less motivated individuals will be to
use property under their control efficiently. Private ownership con-
25. See, e.g., Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II Politico 816 (1965):
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 347
(1967); E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights (1974); Furuboin
& Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10J.
Econ. Lit. 1137 (1972); De Alessi, Property Rights and Privatization, 36 Proc. Acad. Pol.
Sci. 24 (S. Hanke ed. 1987) (volume entitled Prospects for Privatization).
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centrates rights and rewards; public ownership dilutes them. The
property rights school does not recognize any fundamental change
in the working of private enterprise as a result of the separation of
ownership and management in the modern corporation. To be
sure, shareholders in large corporations cannot monitor manage-
ment as closely as the owner of the classical firm could oversee his
enterprise. However, in this view, the market generates the needed
spur to prevent corporate management from dissipating value
through excessive salaries or slack attention. If returns from the en-
terprise are low, shareholders will sell their stock and the price will
be depressed. In the extreme case, the firm may be acquired by out-
siders and the managers may lose their jobs. These crucial deter-
rents to inefficient management are missing from the public sector.
Since "shareholders" (citizens) have no transferable property rights
in public enterprise, they cannot sell stock as a signal of dissatisfac-
tion with performance; even moving to anotherjurisdiction is costly.
Moreover, there is no "market for corporate control": public enter-
prises cannot be taken over by bidders who believe that they can
make more efficient use of the assets. Hence, according to the the-
ory, there is no check on the dissipation of value by the management
of public enterprises.
It is worth taking note of the premises and implications of the
property rights approach. First, the theory holds that the form of
ownership is the predominant explanation for the varying perform-
ance of different organizations. The theory gives no importance
whatsoever to organizational characteristics such as size, centraliza-
tion, hierarchy, or leadership. Nor does it recognize any variation in
performance that might stem from task characteristics, such as poor
information or ambiguity about goals. The theory does not even
recognize the effects of economic incentives unrelated to property
rights, such as those originating in various types of contracts. The
theory does not point to any contingencies in generalizing about
public-private differences; it does not identify any particular condi-
tions or characteristics that might cause public institutions to per-
form well. The disease the theory diagnoses in the public sector is,
so to speak, genetic and incurable.
Second, the theory takes the market as the standard for judging
value and finds public institutions deficient because they fail to mea-
sure up to that standard, e.g., their "shareholders" cannot sell stock.
Survival in the market, of course, depends on the capacity of organi-
zations to produce a residual reward for the owners-a profit. This
is not the standard that public institutions generally need to meet.
The property rights approach says that society would be better off if,
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instead of meeting approval in the political process, public organiza-
tions or their assets were privately owned and had to meet the test
of profitability.
Third, the property rights theory assumes that the market for cor-
porate control is highly efficient and that the chief reason corpora-
tions are acquired is their management's poor performance. In the
United States today, however, some corporations are acquired be-
cause they have built up large pools of cash, while other corpora-
tions avoid being acquired because their managers take preventive
but inefficient measures, such as piling up debt. Frequently, behe-
moths with large cash flow but low returns on equity and other in-
dicators of poor performance have taken over firms with much
better records. 26 Virtue is not always rewarded in the market for
corporate control; nonetheless, according to the property rights
view, market discipline forces managers of private firms to be more
efficient than public managers. The theory gives no weight at all to
the monitoring capacities of the state, the public at large, and the
various institutions of a liberal democracy, such as the press, that
routinely scrutinize the performance of public institutions. The rea-
sons for this dim view of public monitoring are spelled out in the
theory of public choice.
"Public choice," ill-named because the only choices it recognizes
are essentially private, is both a branch of microeconomics and an
ideologically-laden view of democratic politics. Analysts of the
school apply the logic of microeconomics to politics and generally
find that whereas self-interest leads to benign results in the market-
place, it produces nothing but pathology in political decisions.2 7
These pathological patterns represent different kinds of "free-rid-
ing" and "rent-seeking" by voters, bureaucrats, politicians, and re-
cipients of public funds. Coalitions of voters seeking special
advantage from the state join together to get favorable legislation
enacted. Rather than being particularly needy, these groups are
likely to be those whose big stake in a benefit arouses them to more
effective action than is taken by the taxpayers at large over whom
the costs are spread. In general, individuals with "concentrated"
interests in increased expenditure take a "free ride" on those with
"diffuse" interests in lower taxes. Similarly, the managers of the
"bureaucratic firms" seek to maximize budgets, and thereby to ob-
26. The acquisitions by General Motors, U.S. Steel (now USX), and W.R. Grace cor-
porations provide illustrations.
27. See, e.g., J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); W. Nis-
kanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971); Budgets and Bureaucrats:
The Sources of Government Growth (T. Borcherding ed. 1977).
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tain greater power, larger salaries, and other perquisites. Budget
maximization results in higher government spending overall, ineffi-
cient allocation among government agencies, and inefficient pro-
duction within them. In addition, when government agencies give
out grants, the potential grantees expend resources in lobbying up
to the value of the grants-an instance of the more general "polit-
ical dissipation of value" resulting from the scramble for political
favors and jobs.
Thus, like the theory of property rights, the public choice per-
spective indicts public ownership and management across the
board. The exponents of these views have developed their position
through studies of the public management of land, forests, water,
and other natural resources and comparative analyses of public and
private enterprises in a variety of industries, including airlines, fire
protection, and solid waste disposal. 28 The property rights view of
natural resource management exemplifies application of the theory.
Public ownership, in this view, inexorably leads to what Garrett Har-
din has called "the tragedy of the commons." 29 Acting out of ra-
tional self-interest, individuals abuse and ultimately destroy the
commons but take good care of their own private property. Thus
publicly managed grazing land and forests purportedly suffer from
worse management than privately owned land and forests. More-
over, the public agencies responsible for resource management,
such as the Forest Service, dissipate value through self-aggrandizing
expansionary policies. Consequently, privatizing the public domain
would better ensure its conservation and efficient use.30 One plan
for "privatizing the environment" calls for the sale to private inves-
tors of federal lands, including national parks, or their transfer to
private associations such as the Audubon Society; the same author
even recommends solving the problem of endangered species by
creating new property rights in wildlife. 3'
In short, starting with an individualistic model of human behavior,
the public choice school makes a series of empirical claims: (1) that
28. See, e.g., Ahlbrandt, Efficiency in the Provision of Fire Services, 16 Pub. Choice 1
(1973); Davies, The Efficiency of Public Versus Private Firms, the Case of Australia's
Two Airlines, 14J. Law & Econ. 149 (1971); Bennett & Johnson, Public Versus Private
Provision of Collective Goods and Services: Garbage Collection Revisited, 34 Pub.
Choice 55 (1979).
29. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
30. See, e.g., Forestlands: Public and Private (R. Deacon & M. Johnson eds. 1985);
Hanke & Dowdle, Privatizing the Public Domain, 36 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 114 (S. Hanke
ed. 1987) (volume entitled Prospects for Privatization).
31. See Smith, Privatizing the Environment, 20 Pol. Rev. 1 I (1982); Smith, Resolving
the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife, I Cato J.
439 (1981).
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democratic polities have inherent tendencies toward government
growth and excessive budgets; (2) that expenditure growth is due to
self-interested coalitions of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats; and
(3) that public enterprises necessarily perform less efficiently than
private enterprises.
A thorough analysis of the claims of the public choice school
would be a book in itself, but the general lines of criticism may be at
least briefly suggested. First, while the theory presents voters as
narrowly self-interested, considerable evidence suggests that, even
on economic issues, voters identify their interests with the overall
performance of the economy, rather than simply voting in line with
their private experience. 32 Voters, in other words, are capable of
recognizing a collective interest apart from their own. Indeed, the
whole point of "government by discussion" is to discover and ex-
press common interests not easily voiced or achieved in the private
sphere. The public choice approach simply does not comprehend
this preference-shaping function of political democracy. It also ne-
glects the restraints built into the architecture of liberalism. While
the theory holds that government is systematically biased toward
dissipating value and increasing expenditure, it disregards the
checks and balances among branches of government and within
them. The scrutiny of spending programs by Congress and the Of-
fice of Management and Budget is an example. According to the
theory, spending programs get approved because they have concen-
trated benefits and diffused costs; however, the same arguments ap-
ply to tax reductions for specific interests (that is, tax expenditures).
Thus "fiscal illusions" should be symmetrical on the spending and
tax sides of the budgetary process and cannot explain long-term
tendencies toward higher tax levels. The "Leviathan theorists," as
Richard Musgrave calls them, also overstate the historical trend to-
ward higher government expenditure; the evidence does not show
an accelerating increase as a proportion of national income. 33
The empirical evidence comparing efficiency in public and private
organizations is also more complex than the property rights and
public choice schools acknowledge. To take the example of re-
source management again, Carlisle Ford Runge points out that the
evidence suggests that federally owned rangeland is in better condi-
32. The evidence against the public choice view of political behavior is summed up
in Orren, Beyond Self-Interest, in The Power of Public Ideas 13 (R. Reich ed. 1988). See
also Kelman, Why Public Ideas Matter, in The Power of Public Ideas, supra, at 3 1.
33. Musgrave, Leviathan Cometh--or Does He?, in Tax and Expenditure Limita-
tions 77 (H. Ladd & T. Tideman eds. 1981).
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tion than nonfederal rangeland.3 4 In one of the few relevant studies
of forestland, a survey in Minnesota indicates that extremely few pri-
vate purchasers of tax-forfeited public forests did anything whatso-
ever to maintain them.3 5 The "tragedy of the commons" argument
confuses resources in common ownership with resources in public
ownership; it fails to give any credit to the democratic process or to
professional management in raising the time horizons of voters, pol-
iticians, and bureaucrats to a level higher than that prevailing in the
marketplace. Many observers have noted the propensity of Ameri-
can managers for concentrating on short-term profits; the property
rights school, by contrast, bravely asserts that private firms have suf-
ficient incentive to preserve wildlife and wilderness for future
generations .3
The rhetoric of the public choice school is a kind of hard-nosed
realism. The theory dismisses as naive civic ideals such as public
service; it denies the capacity of voters or politicians to act on the
basis of a national interest wider than their own private aggrandize-
ment. Rather like marxism, public choice theory claims to face up to
the self-interested basis of democratic politics and therefore treats
all claims of higher purpose as smoke and deception. And also like
marxism, the theory presents itself as a scientific advance over ear-
lier romantic and idealized views of the state. But rather than being
an advance of science over intuition, the appeal of the public choice
school is precisely to those who are intuitively certain that whatever
government does, the private sector can do better. Together, the
property rights and public choice schools show only that, if you start
by assuming a purely individualistic model of human behavior and
treat politics as if it were a pale imitation of the market, democracy
will, indeed, make no sense.
2. Economic Model 2: Privatization as a Relocation of Economic
Functions. Compared to the right-wing schools that condemn the
public sector as irredeemably inefficient, policy analysts trained in
conventional microeconomics tend to have a more qualified, though
still highly critical, view of public institutions. Rather than attribute
the performance of public organizations to the incentives created by
public ownership per se, mainstream policy analysts generally think
of designing the right incentives within the framework of public or-
34. Runge, The Fallacy of "Privatization,"J. Contemp. Stud., Winter 1984, at 3,12.
35. Ellefson, Palm, & Lothner, From Public Land to Nonindustrial Private Forest: A
Minnesota Case Study, J. Forestry, Apr. 1982, at 219.
36. Krutilla, et al., Public versus Private Ownership: The Federal Lands Case, 2 J.
Pol. Analysis & Mgmt. 548 (1983).
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ganization. Of course, the overwhelming consensus is that private
ownership is more efficient in providing private goods in competi-
tive markets; hence it is rare to find any respectable opinion in favor
of government ownership of factories producing high-performance
sports cars. Mainstream views do vary, however, about the proper
role of public institutions in producing public goods and managing
natural monopolies. Viewing competition as the critical issue, the
neoclassically trained are inclined to favor privatization insofar as it
represents a move toward competition under conditions when mar-
kets should be expected to work efficiently. However, in recent
years the requirements for efficient markets have come to be under-
stood more liberally, while the reputation of public enterprise has
markedly declined. Hence, the prevailing consensus in economics
and policy analysis has become more sympathetic to privatization
than it was two or three decades ago.
While the property rights view is parsimonious and unambiguous
in analyzing the basis of public-private differences, the more con-
ventional approach is a patchwork of theories about the conditions
under which the market, the state, and the nonprofit sector fail to
perform efficiently. In this tradition, the theory of market failure is
the historical point of departure. According to the received neoclas-
sical wisdom, imperfect information, externalities, increasing re-
turns to scale, and (in some versions) inequalities of wealth prevent
the market from achieving optimal performance; it is then a short-
though not a necessary-step to say that where the market fails,
some form of public ownership or regulation is justified. (The the-
ory says nothing about the choice between regulation and owner-
ship.) However, two recent developments have suggested more
caution about public intervention. First, markets need not be per-
fectly competitive to perform efficiently; they only need to be con-
testable-and the requirements for contestability are nore easily
met. 37 Second, public choice theory has successfully raised the chal-
lenge that where markets fail, so, too, may government; indeed, the
theory suggests that government's performance will only be worse.
Attempting to state the argument symmetrically, Charles Wolf, Jr.,
has spelled out a series of conditions for "nonmarket failure. ' ' : s
These twin theories of market and nonmarket failure have, in
turn, suggested a role for the nonprofit sector; for if states and mar-
kets have peculiar weaknesses, perhaps philanthropy can be ex-
37. W. Baumol,J. Panzar & R. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theorv of Indus-
try Structure (1982).
38. Wolf, A Theory of Non-Market Failures, Pub. Interest, Spring 1979, at 114.
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plained as an attempt to fill the void. 39 But, rather than define the
voluntary sector as residual, Lester Salamon has argued that in the
United States nonprofits are the "preferred" mechanism for deliver-
ing public services and that government programs arise to meet the
problems of "voluntary failure." 40 The upshot is a theoretical amal-
gam that defines the limits of the three sectors and suggests in what
form different kinds of activities are most efficiently organized.
From this perspective, privatization becomes a way to move activity
from a less efficient to a more efficient form-a tool of economic
adjustment rather than radical reconstruction. 4 1
The expanded theory of sector failure is a kind of ecological ap-
proach to institutional choice. The various sectors provide alterna-
tive environments, and the problem is to decide whether a particular
set of tasks is best carried out in one or more locations. However,
the theory does not exhaustively assign all activities. No sector gets
high marks for performing tasks for which there is poor information.
The theory is also ahistorical; it makes no allowance for sunk invest-
ments in organizational capacity. Relocating an industry in a differ-
ent sector is not, after all, a costless exercise. However, the most
serious defect of this approach is that, like all the economic models,
it is principally concerned with efficiency and has little to say about
the effects of organizational design on other values. To subject an
organization to market forces is to push it to maximize the returns
to residual claims holders; perhaps it will generate those returns
more efficiently, but as George Yarrow has observed, some activities
have been turned over to the public sector precisely to be protected
from such pressure. 42 The economic models cannot say whether or
not that is a sensible choice.
B. Privatization as Community Empowerment
A different set of arguments, not chiefly concerned with efficiency,
comes from a more sociological theory of privatization that empha-
sizes the strengthening of communities. In the most noteworthy ex-
position of this position, Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus
propose that government "empower" voluntary associations, com-
39. J. Douglas, Why Charity? (1983).
40. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-
Nonprofit Relations, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 99, 113 (W. Pow-
ell ed. 1987).
41. For an analysis of this perspective, see Young & Brodkin, The Political Economy
of Privatization, in Privatization and the Welfare State (S. Kamerman & A. Kahn eds.)
(forthcoming).
42. Yarrow, Privatization in Theory and Practice, 2 Econ. Pol'y 324, 331-32 (1986).
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munity organizations, churches, self-help groups, and other less for-
mal "mediating" institutions that lie between individuals and
society's "alienating megastructures." 43 In their view, the modern
liberal state has undermined these "value-generating," "value-
maintaining," "people-sized institutions" by establishing service bu-
reaucracies that take over their functions. Berger and Neuhaus are
not opposed to the provision of social welfare, but they urge that,
wherever possible, public policy rely on mediating institutions for
the delivery of publicly financed services.
The view of privatization as community empowerment stands in
sharp contrast to the conception of privatization as an extension of
property rights. Berger and Neuhaus emphatically reject a narrowly
individualistic view of human motivation. Indeed, they criticize lib-
eralism precisely for defending individual rights over the rights of
social groups to assert their own values; for example, they defend
the capacity of neighborhoods to sustain "democratically deter-
mined values in the public sphere" by exhibiting religious symbols
in public places. 44 They also suggest that attacks on the ideals of
voluntary service "aid the expansion of the kind of capitalist mental-
ity that would put a dollar sign on everything on the grounds that
only that which has a price tag has worth." 45 Their concern is not to
expand the domain of the profit motive but rather to strengthen lo-
cal, small-scale forms of social provision. This is privatization with a
human face, and it bears some resemblance to left-wing interest in
community organizations and cooperatives. 46
Although I find the community empowerment view more attrac-
tive than the property rights perspective, the Berger and Neuhaus
claim that the liberal state undermines mediating institutions ig-
nores the historical partnership between the two. The history of so-
cial provision in the United States does not, in fact, betray a
disregard for the virtues of voluntary institutions. Salamon points
out that the twentieth-century expansion of social spending in the
United States has been largely a growth of what he calls "third-
party" government (the third parties including local government as
well as private nonprofit agencies). 47 Many nonprofit community
43. P. Berger & R. Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Struc-
tures in Public Policy (1977).
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. at 36-7.
46. See, e.g., Donnison, The Progressive Potential of Privatisation, in Privatisation
and the Welfare State 45 U. LeGrand & R. Robinson eds. 1984).
47. Salamon, supra note 40, at 110.
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organizations have depended for their survival on government sub-
sidies. Moreover, today there is often a division of labor between
the public and voluntary sectors. A still greater reliance on the non-
profit sector might pose serious problems for the voluntary institu-
tions themselves. To be sure, privatization is taking place in many
social services, but the growth is chiefly of new for-profit organiza-
tions that are far from the local "people-sized" institutions envi-
sioned by Berger and Neuhaus. Some of them, like the national
chains of nursing homes, are every bit as alienating as other corpo-
rate "megastructures." It is probably an illusion to think that a ma-
jor shift toward private social services would lead to a proliferation
of community organizations, if only because the private institutions
would need much more capital than they traditionally have had
available. If not supplied by the state, the capital must be supplied
by the financial markets. In health care, the demand of capital for-
mation is one of the principal pressures producing a shift from non-
profit to commercial organization, often national in scale. 48
Community empowerment might be a good idea, but if it is to come
at all, it will come from more government intervention, not from
privatization.
C. Privatization as a Reduction of Government Overload
A final theory justifying privatization holds that privatization is de-
sirable for its likely political effect in deflecting and reducing de-
mands on the state. In the 1970s, some critics suggested that the
Western democracies were suffering from an "overload" of pres-
sure, responsible for excessive spending and poor economic per-
formanceY9 In that framework privatization represents one of
several policies encouraging a counterrevolution of declining expec-
tations. In a similar vein, Stuart Butler of the Heritage Foundation
has argued that privatization can cure budget deficits by breaking up
the kind of public spending coalitions described by public choice
theory. Privatizing government enterprises and public services, in
this view, will redirect aspirations into the market and encourage a
more entrepreneurial consciousness. 50
The political theory of privatization has several different, overlap-
ping elements. First, the privatization of enterprises is a privatiza-
48. Starr, Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982).
49. S. Huntington, M. Crozier & J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy 163-64
(1975).
50. S. Butler, Privatizing Federal Spending: A Strategy to Eliminate the Deficit 43-
62 (1985).
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tion of employment relations. The advocates of privatization hope
to divert employees' wage claims from the public treasury, with its
vast capacity for taxing and borrowing, to private employers, who
presumably will have more spine in resisting wage demands. More-
over, the proponents hope for a trickle-down of entrepreneurship
from the newly privatized managers to the workers; for that very
reason, privatizers often are perfectly willing to sell to the workers,
at an advantageous price, whole enterprises or at least some propor-
tion of the shares. In addition, by shifting to private contractors
even in a few selected areas, government might signal a harder line
on wage concessions and thereby weaken public employee unions.
Second, the advocates of privatization hope also for a privatiza-
tion of beneficiaries' claims. Instead of marching outside of govern-
ment offices when things go wrong, the privatizers want them to
direct their ire to private service providers-or better yet, simply to
switch to other providers. In other words, privatization could mean
a wholesale shift, in Hirschman's terms, from "voice" to "exit" as
the usual and preferred tactic of coping with dissatisfaction. 5'
Third, the privatization of public assets and enterprises is also a
privatization of wealth. Advocates such as Margaret Thatcher want
privatization to increase the proportion of the population who own
shares of stock and therefore take a more positive view of profit-
making.52 "People's capitalism" is an old idea, but using privatiza-
tion of public assets to bring it about is new. Moreover, by privatiz-
ing other assets such as public housing and Social Security trust
funds, privatizers hope to turn public claimants into property own-
ers and engender in them a deeper identification with capitalism.
They expect the worker who receives a retirement income from a
private pension or individual retirement account to have a more
conservative view of the world than that of the worker who depends
on rent subsidies and a government check every month.
This political theory of privatization, like the economic and socio-
logical theories, contains empirical predictions as well as normative
judgments. The predictions concern the probable effects of priva-
tization on political consciousness and action; the normative judg-
ments concern the desirability of weakening the political
foundations of public provision. Empirically, it seems unlikely that
contracting-out, vouchers, and other arrangements for paying pri-
51. A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970).
52. Francis, Britain Pushing "People's Capitalism," Christian Sci. Monitor July 17.
1985, at 21; Smith, Trhe British Scene, 64 Foreign Aft. 923, 930-31 (1986).
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vate providers will reduce pressure on government spending; the
contractors are as likely as public employees to lobby for larger
budgets. 53 However, some forms of privatization may, indeed,
change the underlying political values, understandings, and capaci-
ties for action in society. Turning public tenants into private home-
owners, public employees into private employees, and Social
Security beneficiaries into investors in private retirement accounts
could very well change their frame of social and political thought.
These prospects raise rather different issues from the usual effi-
ciency-minded discussions of privatization; they demand that we
consider the meaning of privatization not only as a theory but also
as a political practice.
III. Privatization as a Political Practice
I said earlier that the structural variety of public and private orga-
nizations, political systems, and national contexts makes it difficult
to generalize about public-private differences and the effects of
privatization. The task of generalization is still more complex be-
cause the forms of privatization vary so greatly. In this section, I
spell out some of the contextual factors and critical choices that
shape what privatization means in practice and that help to explain
why political practice often conflicts with theory.
A. The Political Contexts and Uses of Privatization
The meaning of privatization depends in practice on a nation's
position in the world economy. In the wealthier countries it is easy
to treat privatization purely as a question of domestic policy. But
where the likely buyers are foreign, as in the Third World, privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises often means denationalization-a
transfer of control to foreign investors or managers. Since state
ownership often originally came about in an act of national self-as-
sertion, privatization appears to be a retreat in the face of interna-
tional pressure. In that sense, national memory colors the meaning
of privatization. However, even in the United States, privatization
would be understood rather differently if public assets up for sale or
contracts up for bid were likely to be taken over by the Russians or
even the Japanese. The more dependent a nation is on foreign in-
vestment, the greater the likelihood that privatization will raise the
53. Starr, The Limits of Privatization, in 36 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 124, 128 (S. Hanke
ed. 1987) (volume entitled Prospects for Privatization).
Vol. 6:6, 1988
The Meaning of Privatization
prospect of diminished sovereignty and excite the passions of na-
tionalism. Where privatization raises such issues, it is often blocked,
or citizens and domestic firms are reserved exclusive rights to pub-
licly offered assets, shares, or contracts. In many Western countries,
state ownership owed more in the first place to nationalist than to
socialist sentiment; hence it is scarcely surprising that nationalism is
liable to derail or distort privatization plans.
Throughout the world, the privatization of enterprises with strate-
gic military or economic significance raises especially sensitive ques-
tions of sovereignty and security. In most oil-producing countries,
for example, no government is likely to try to privatize the state oil
companies because of the likely domestic political reaction. Even in
Great Britain, the prospective sale of a helicopter company to an
American company caused a political stir.54 Despite its commitment
to free markets, the Reagan Administration intervened in 1987 to
prevent the sale to a Japanese corporation of a private American
semiconductor company with important defense contracts. 5 5 On
the other hand, the Reagan administration has sought to privatize
some of NASA's satellite launch operations partly in the hope of
strengthening the private American space industry in its competi-
tion with the Europeans. 56 Yet this case only reinforces the general
point: The conflict between privatization and national interests de-
pends on the relative power of a given state in the world system-
the weaker the state, the more likely the conflict. Economically
strong nations, knowing that they can privatize without jeopardizing
their sovereignty, lecture the weak on the perils of state enterprise
and restrictions on investment.
Like national interests, the more parochial concerns of politically
dominant racial and ethnic groups may also confound privatization
plans. In many countries, ethnic minorities, such as Indians in East
Africa, make up disproportionate numbers of the potential domestic
buyers of public assets. When a country's bureaucratic and en-
trepreneurial classes differ in ethnic composition, privatization may
be understood as a transfer of wealth and power from one group to
another and be politically resisted for that reason. Even if privatiza-
54. Marshall, Copter Firm's Bail-out Splits British Cabinet, L.A. Times, Dec. 31,
1985, § 4 at 2, col. 5.
55. Rempel & Walters, The Fairchild Deal: Trade War: When Chips Were Down,
L.A. Times. Nov. 30, 1987, § 1, at I, col. 1.
56. Broad, Space Drive's Tilt to Industry Gains Wide New Impetus, N.Y. Times, Jan.
24. 1988, § 1, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4.
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tion is adopted, the field of potential buyers may be so restricted
that potential gains from more efficient management evaporate.
The larger point in these examples of "distorting" influences on
privatization is that private sectors are not only characterized by pri-
vate ownership in the abstract. The potential private owners of pub-
lic assets and contractors for public services represent specific
interests and groups. Privatization is unlikely to be carried out with
indifference to those social facts.
In general, the political uses of privatization are bound to com-
promise the avowed efficiency objectives. Governments that are in a
hurry to sell state-owned enterprises may make concessions to cur-
rent managers, whose cooperation is instrumental in divestiture.
Privatization then becomes an occasion for managerial enrichment
and entrenchment. It is striking that in Great Britain, France, and
other countries that have privatized state-owned enterprises, priva-
tization usually brings about little or no change in top manage-
ment.5 7 Moreover, governments commonly offer assets and
enterprises up for sale to political allies. Some of these properties,
such as broadcasting stations, are not simply economic but political
assets; the incumbent government gains obvious advantage by plac-
ing them in the hands of political allies. The same patterns have
long been evident in the contracting of public services; indeed, con-
tracting is the locus classicus of the political pay-off. Even public offer-
ings are not immune from political use. When governments
underprice shares-as has been the overwhelming pattern in Brit-
ainS -they may be seeking to ensure not only that privatization is
successfully realized, but also that happy shareholders have the op-
portunity to repay the government at the next election. Indeed,
rather perversely, one could turn the whole force of public choice
analysis on privatization itself: The logic of concentrated benefits
and diffuse costs makes it altogether likely that the diffuse efficiency
gains of privatization will be sacrificed in the effort to satisfy the big
stakeholders-incumbent politicians and bureaucrats and their allies
and supporters.
Politically inspired privatization is all the more likely because
privatization attracts support not only from economists with a disin-
terested belief in liberalized markets but also from a privatization
57. Seminar with Hel&ne Ploix, Executive Director, International Monetary Fund,
Privatization Successes in )eveloped and Developing Countries, Princeton University,
Jan. 14, 1988.
58. Mayer & Meadowcroft, Selling Public Assets: Techniques and Financial Implica-
lions, in Privatization and Regulation: The U.K. Experience, supra note 23, at 322.
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lobby consisting of investment banking firms, government contrac-
tors, and other corporations whose businesses stand to benefit if the
public sector cedes ground. Rather than being an escape from in-
terest group influence and the politicization of resource use, priva-
tization typically provides a prime example.
I do not want to suggest, however, that the view of politics as pure
self-interest captures all that is going on, even in the case of priva-
tization. Privatization is a worldwide policy movement carried along
by a combination of objective forces, imitative processes, and inter-
,national financial sponsorship. Many countries whose public sectors
expanded sharply in recent decades now find themselves confronted
by rising debt and strong resistance to higher taxes. Privatizing
state-owned firms promises to bring some fiscal relief, particularly
where the treasury has been heavily subsidizing unprofitable enter-
prises. Privatization may help both to cut expenditures and boost
revenues, and, by converting debt to equity, states may improve the
overall financial structure of their economies and reduce pressure
for even less palatable austerity measures. Privatization is not the
only possible response, but as in other institution-shaping move-
ments, like the postwar spread of public enterprises, organizational
forms spread by imitation. Institutional models are disseminated
through a variety of political networks and the direct influence of
international lending organizations. Privatization is now one of the
policies that the International Monetary Fund promotes in negotiat-
ing loans with developing countries. 59
Of course, proponents of privatization see the process more as
learning than as imitation or imposition. In their view, the poor
performance of public enterprise and, more generally, overex-
panded public sectors has simply taught that privatization makes
sense. But experience is never so transparent. Even where state en-
terprises are generally agreed to be highly inefficient, it is not neces-
sarily clear that privatization will be a remedy. Moreover, the
performance of some state-owned enterprises-for example, in Ma-
laysia and France-has been excellent, and it is simply not true that
59. See, e.g., Brooke, International Report: Guinea Booms as Markets Replace Marx-
ism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1987, at D8, col. 1; Killen, West Africa Turns to Private Sector
for Efficiency, Reuter Bus. Rep., Sept. 4, 1987 (BC cycle); IMF Approves $1.7 Billion
Standby Loan for Mexico, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 880 (Dec. 1. 1986).
However, see also Gains From Privatization May Be Small. Without Measures to Boost
Competition, IMF Survey, March 23, 1987, at 82.
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as public sectors grow, rates of economic growth fall. 60 To be sure,
the record of central government planning is dismal, but that expe-
rience cannot simply be extrapolated to all publicly owned organiza-
tions, particularly in states with more autonomous forms of public
sector management.
The property rights approach predicts politically imposed ineffi-
ciency on the basis of public ownership alone, but the variety of
public sectors and state-owned enterprises in the world suggests in-
stead that performance may be contingent on political culture, the
structure of the state, and public policy toward enterprises. In some
countries public management is well-established, professional, and
prestigious, whereas in others the political party in power expects to
give its own people jobs at every level. The mode of public sector
control depends also on the structure of political-administrative re-
lationships. It is a mistake in this context to view the state as a uni-
tary actor. Public sectors often comprise a vast sprawl of
organizations in public ownership, many of them, like public univer-
sities in the United States, only loosely connected to the centers of
political decisionmaking. A great array of institutional devices, such
as independent governing boards with self-perpetuating member-
ship and earmarked financing, can serve to insulate public organiza-
tions from political intervention. In their legal status, public
organizations variously include agencies under direct political au-
thority, independent authorities incorporated under public law,
state-owned enterprises incorporated under private law, and private
companies in which the government has some ownership. Of
course, the legal differences may or may not matter; autonomy is
never guaranteed purely by formal structure. Finally, as a matter of
policy, governments may or may not require public enterprises to be
run on a commercial, business-like basis. Privatization may have lit-
tle impact on the efficiency of organizations already operated on a
commercial basis, and the effect of privatizing more politicized orga-
nizations depends on their previous political uses, some of which
may be eminently defensible.
Political culture and preexisting administrative capacities are not
unreasonable bases for choices about state versus private owner-
ship. Where the state is the only domestic institution capable of sus-
taining the confidence of foreign creditors or administering large
60. See generally Saunders, Public Expenditure and Economic Perfbrmance in OECD
Countries,.5J. Pub. Pol'y 1 (1986); R. Kuttner, The Economic Illusion: False Choices
Between Prosperity and Social Justice (1984).
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undertakings and where it has demonstrated management compe-
tence, the case for state enterprise may be correspondingly strong.
On ,the other hand, in some regimes the penchant for political in-
tervention produces endemic overstaffing, poor location of plants,
extravagant wages, and prices far out of line with market levels.
Like alcoholics unable to cut down except by quitting altogether,
these governments may be unable to avoid disrupting public enter-
prises, except by privatizing them altogether. Moreover, in much of
the world, state enterprise gives the dominant elites too powerful a
grip over civil society. For example, the Argentine military is said to
use -its huge network of industrial enterprises as an instrument of
patronage and power.6 1 In such cases, privatization may well bejus-
tified as a means of releasing society from bureaucratic domination.
Whether the advanced capitalist societies suffer from too strong a
bureaucratic grip is, of course, exactly where the right and left disa-
gree. In this respect, the United States, which has never national-
ized industry in the first place, stands in a position fundamentally
different from the Western European countries with extensive pub-
lic enterprise sectors. The sphere of public ownership in the United
States has been so limited that I find implausible the view that
Americans suffer from an oppressive government role in the pro-
duction of goods and services. The relations between the public
sector and political leadership are drastically different in the United
States from those prevailing in Latin America, the Soviet bloc, and
even many Western European countries. If political meddling is the
chief problem in public sector organizations, tfie United States has
an effective alternative to privatization in the establishment of public
corporations (often called public authorities in the United States).
Their insulation from political control, the independence of the ju-
diciary, and the decentralization of power in the federal system pre-
vent public authorities from being easily bent by political caprice.
Indeed, the problems of the American public sector seem to be of
the opposite kind. So deeply entrenched are the barriers to unitary
control that legitimate interests in coordinated management are
thwarted. American public institutions at all levels of government
suffer from rampant credentialism and proceduralism that hamper
the ability of managers to hire and fire, reward, and motivate their
subordinates. Ironically, many of these rigidities result from previ-
ous reforms, passed in the name of curbing corruption. For a vari-
61. Fontana, Armed Forces and Neo-Conservative Ideology: State Shrinking in Ar-
gentina, 1976-81, in State Shrinking, supra note 18. at 62-74.
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ety of reasons, public organizations also do not respond quickly to
change, such as the emergence of new technologies and consumer
demands. The long lead times required by the appropriations pro-
cess often prevent agencies from adapting quickly. Privatization is
one route out of the procedural thicket; however, we might achieve
some of the same ends by making public administration more flexi-
ble and giving public managers more independent authority.
To be sure, government cannot be run "just like a business" in
part because its more elaborate procedures are meant to produce
something else besides the specific services that the private sector
provides. Reviews by advisory committees and congressional hear-
ings, designed to increase accountability or to give a fair hearing to
complaints by clients, contractors, or employees, cannot be dis-
missed simply as a source of inefficiency. Democratic government
cannot narrowly concern itself with getting the job done, which is
one reason why it should not concern itself with all the jobs that
need doing. Privatization is a legitimate tool for sharpening the fo-
cus of government on those activities most important to the general
welfare, but it is never simply efficiency that is at stake in such
decisions.
B. Privatization as a Reordering of Claims
Privatization needs to be understood as a fundamental reordering
of claims in a society. As I indicated earlier, in the liberal world the
terms public and private sum up a whole structure of rules and ex-
pectations about the proper conduct and limits of the state. To say
some activity is public is to invoke claims of public purpose, public
accountability, and public disclosure. To say something is private is
to claim protection from state officials and other citizens. The the-
ory of property rights sees privatization as a reassignment of claims
to the control and use of assets, but it misses the special claims of
the public sphere in a democratic society-claims for greater disclo-
sure of information, which should improve the social capacity to
make choices, and for rights of participation and discussion, which
permit the discovery and formation of preferences that are more
consistent with long-term societal interests. As a general movement
of institutional design, privatization undermines the foundation of
claims for public purpose and public services.
This reordering of claims holds distributive implications. It shifts
power to those who can more readily exercise power in the market.
It also may shift income and wealth, depending on the specific form
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that privatization takes. Some forms of privatization do not logically
require a reduction in public benefits to the poor. It is hypotheti-
cally possible to conceive of a privatization program with highly pro-
gressive effects on income distribution. Imagine, for example, a
program involving the sale of heavily subsidized, poorly managed
public enterprises: the conversion of a publicly budgeted health ser-
vice, covering only a minority of employed workers, into a voucher
system covering the whole population; and the empowerment of lo-
cal nonprofit, grassroots organizations with funds stripped from
elite-dominated central bureaucracies. Taken together these steps
would redistribute benefits to previously excluded or short-changed
groups.
In practice, however, a progressive effect on income distribution
seems highly improbable. The same political forces that support
privatization generally also support cutbacks in public spending for
social welfare; the same arguments about incentives and efficiency
used in favor of privatizing public services are also cited by those
who want to terminate public financing for the services altogether.
In addition, private service providers often maximize profits by
seeking out the least costly clients or by employing lower-wage
workers, often on a part-time basis. Since wages tend to be more
equal in the public sector, privatization is likely to skew the income
distribution in the direction of greater inequality. Furthermore,
while unions have lost ground in the private sector, they have gener-
ally made advances in organizing public employees. Privatization
tends to undermine those gains-an effect not overlooked by advo-
cates of privatization.
In the extreme case, privatization is an instrument of class poli-
tics. Where privatization is used to break up public employee un-
ions and reduce the provision of services, it effectively represents a
means of reordering class relations. Privatization in Chile in the
mid-1970s had this character. A vast shift in wealth took place with
the privatization not only of industry but of the financial assets of
the social security system, which ended up concentrated in the
hands of a few private financial groups. 62 At the other extreme,
privatization is a relatively modest tool of public management. In
many cases of contracting, the private firms receiving contracts are
as unionized as the public sector and there is no change in wage
levels. When New York City privatized its school busing, the drivers
62. A. Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics 106-07
(1983).
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continued to be represented by the same union, and service costs
did not change.613 But this is scarcely the kind of example that priva-
tization advocates hope to imitate. Once again, while privatization
hypothetically does not mean wage reductions, the intentions be-
hind the policy raise strong and entirely reasonable suspicions that
it will.
Privatization is not only a policy; it is also a signal about the com-
petence and desirability of public provision. It reinforces the view
that government cannot be expected to perform well. If, to many
Americans, private means better, it is partly because of long-existing
restrictions on the scope and quality of public provision. We com-
monly limit public services to a functional minimum and thereby
guarantee that people will consider the private alternative a step up.
This niggardliness shows itself in ways large and small. In the
1960s, one congressman who was indignant over the costs of a pub-
lic housing program succeeded in persuading his colleagues specifi-
cally to forbid flower boxes as an unnecessary extravagance. 64 The
restricted quality of public provision is a self-reinforcing feature.
Because the poor are the principal beneficiaries of many programs,
the middle-class public opposes expenditures to produce as high a
quality of service as they must pay for privately; and because the
quality is held down, the poor as well as the middle class develop a
contempt for the public sector and an eagerness to escape it. The
movement toward privatization reflects and promotes this con-
tempt, and therein lies part of its political danger.
Some individual proposals for privatization have considerable
merit, but the overall message is clearly to call into doubt the na-
tion's capacity and need for collective provision. The possibilities
for change being discussed are not symmetrical. Privatization advo-
cates raise questions exclusively about the adequacy of the public
sector; the comparable questions about the private sector do not
receive the same attention. Even though privatization is logically
distinct from questions of distributive justice, the privatization de-
bate puts the advocates of more generous public programs entirely
on the defensive. This one-sidedness is why I am opposed to priva-
tization. I am opposed to the political consequences that are likely
to flow from pursuing privatization as a solution to the difficulties of
administering democratic government.
63. Bailey, Uses and Misuses of Privatization, 36 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 138, 145-46 (S.
Hanke ed. 1987) (volume entitled Prospects for Privatization).
64. Talk by Lester Thurow, Williamsburg, Va. (Dec. 1984).
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Privatization, as some advocates themselves point out, represents
an effort to alter the conditions of political competition by breaking
up the coalitions supporting public provision and by promoting
more market-oriented political values. In other words, it is an at-
tempt to fix in place the conservative orientation that has emerged
forcefully in the 1980s. No one need doubt that public institutions,
like private ones, are bases of wealth and power. They are environ-
ments that encourage those who work within them to develop differ-
ent political orientations. To alter the public-private balance is to
change the distribution of material and symbolic resources influenc-
ing the shape of political life. Privatization ought to be frankly rec-
ognized as part of an effort of conservatives to reinforce their own
power position. Since I do not share the values for which that
power is deployed, I distrust privatization. Ultimately I fear that one
form of privatization does entail another-that as we move public
provision into the private sector, we move from the realm of the
open and visible into a domain that is more closed to scrutiny and
access. And in the process, whether or not intending to change, we
are likely to narrow our involvements, interests, and vision of a good
society and a good life.
